In long-term US stock market data the price-dividend ratio strongly predicts future in ‡ation with a positive slope coe¢ cient up to the mid 1970s. Thereafter, the predictability turns negative. We argue that this phenomenon re ‡ects money illusion that disappears during the 1970s. We develop a consumption-based asset pricing model with recursive preferences and either money illusion or in ‡ation nonneutrality that can explain the predictive patterns. The model is also consistent with a structural shift around the mid 1970s in the real interest rate -in ‡ation relationship, thus supporting the hypothesis of disappearing money illusion at that time.
Introduction
Since Fisher (1928) it has been widely recognized that people may su¤er from money illusion in the sense of confusing nominal with real variables. They mistakenly consider an increase in the nominal value due to a general increase in the price level to be an increase in the real purchasing power. In …nancial markets money illusion leads to mispricing and in the …nance literature the most prominent model to explain such mispricing is the Modigliani and Cohn (1979) hypothesis according to which investors discount real cash ‡ows with nominal discount rates. This causes stock markets to be undervalued in times of high in ‡ation and overvalued in times of low in ‡ation. At the time of writing (end of the 1970s) Modigliani and Cohn's hypothesis provided an explanation for the depressed stock prices at the time.
In the …nance literature several studies have reported empirical evidence consistent with the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, e.g. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) , and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008) . 1 The main empirical implication of the hypothesis is that the price-dividend ratio is negatively related to expected in ‡ation. In this literature expected in ‡ation is typically modeled as a smoothed backward-looking function of past in ‡ation. As emphasized by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) , the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis is radical because it assumes that only stock market investors su¤er from money illusion; bond market investors do not display such irrationality. Of course this leaves the question as to why there should be this di¤erence between the two types of investors. As an alternative to the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, Basak and Yan (2010) develop an economic model in which both stock and bond market investors su¤er from money illusion. All investors share the same stochastic discount factor and they behave rationally (optimize and have rational expectations) except that the stochastic discount factor features money illusion. Despite these di¤erences to the Modigliani-Cohn model, Basak and Yan's model shares the main implication with the Modigliani-Cohn hypothesis, i.e. a negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation.
In the current paper we approach the money illusion hypothesis from a new angle. We …rst document that in long-term US data up to the mid 1970s, the price-dividend ratio is strongly and positively related to future in ‡ation (see Figure 1 and Table 1 below ). An interesting implication of this kind of predictability is that real stock returns are more predictable by the price-dividend ratio than nominal stock returns. Similarly, real dividend growth is less predictable than nominal dividend growth. These implications are con…rmed in the data. The positive in ‡ation predictability by the price-dividend ratio is consistent with the presence of money illusion although at …rst sight it seems to be at odds with the prevailing view that stock prices and expected in ‡ation are negatively related.
Next, we develop an economic model that explains the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation. We follow Basak and Yan (2010) and assume that both stock and bond market investors su¤er from money illusion. In their model consumption and dividend growth are independently and identically distributed (iid) and investors have time-separable power utility. However, this model cannot explain the positive stock price -in ‡ation relationship. In the spirit of Bansal and Yaron (2004) , we extend Basak and Yan's model to feature recursive preferences and a small persistent component in consumption and dividend growth. This extension is crucial for generating the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation that we see in the data up to the mid 1970s.
We calibrate the model with reasonable values of preference parameters and show that it generates time-series of in ‡ation, dividend growth, consumption growth, and the price-dividend ratio with moments that match the moments of actual data. In particular, the model is able to match the positive relationship between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation. By contrast, with time-separable power utility -as in Basak and Yan (2010) -the model generates a counterfactual negative relationship between the pricedividend ratio and future in ‡ation. As expected, when we calibrate the model to display no money illusion, there is no relationship between these two variables.
Since the 1970s the strong and positive stock price -in ‡ation relationship has disappeared. Over the last 40 years the price-dividend ratio has been negatively related to future in ‡ation. Thus, a structural shift appears to have happened in the mid 1970s. We document this shift and discuss economic explanations for it. We conjecture that the high-in ‡ation period of the late 1960s and early 1970s made people more aware of the consequences of in ‡ation, and in both the general public and the academic community (cf. Modigliani and Cohn, 1979 ) this led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon of money illusion which contributed to its disappearence. Thus, the disapperance of money illusion resembles the disappearence of …nancial market anomalies when they are discovered, e.g. the well-known 'size anomaly'discovered by Banz (1981) which seems to have disappeared or at least signi…cantly reduced since its discovery, cf. Schwert (2003) .
The increased awareness of in ‡ation and its consequences for the real economy during the 1970s was furthermore triggered by the breakdown of the Phillips curve and the outbreak of 'stag ‡ation'(cf. Bruno and Sachs, 1985) . There is evidence that from the 1970s expected in ‡ation and expected consumption growth become directly connected and that this 'in ‡ation non-neutrality'e¤ect can explain the negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation that characterizes the period since the mid 1970s. In our economic model calibrated to a period starting in the mid 1970s, when we replace money illusion with a direct negative relationship between expected consumption growth and expected in ‡ation -as in e.g. Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) -the pricedividend ratio signi…cantly predicts future in ‡ation with a negative sign, in accordance with the data. By contrast, this version of the model cannot explain the data up to the mid 1970s.
Thus, compared to the existing literature, our analysis o¤ers the following new explanation of the stock price -in ‡ation relationship in the US over the period 1871-2016: Up to the mid 1970s …nancial market investors su¤ered from money illusion, resulting in a positive relation between stock prices and expected in ‡ation. After the high-in ‡ation period of the 1970s, money illusion disappeared. Instead, since the mid 1970s expected in ‡ation has had a direct negative impact on expected economic growth which has resulted in a negative relationship between stock prices and expected in ‡ation.
As further evidence in support of our model, we analyze the implications of the model for the term structure of real interest rates. In general, the literature has found that real interest rates are negatively related to expected in ‡ation (Ang, Bekaert, and Wei, 2008; Bansal and Shaliastovich, 2013) . Our model is consistent with this …nding. In addition, in the model money illusion implies that the short-term real interest rate predicts future in ‡ation with a negative coe¢ cient. This relationship is con…rmed in US data up to the mid 1970s, but is signi…cantly weakened thereafter. Thus, interestingly, there seems to be a structural shift in the real interest rate -in ‡ation relationship around the mid 1970s which can be explained by the disappearence of money illusion, consistent with our explanation for the structural shift in the stock price -in ‡ation relationship.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical evidence of the relationship between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation. It also documents the structural shift in the relationship in the mid 1970s. In Section 3 we develop an economic model featuring money illusion that explains the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation up to the mid 1970s. This includes a simulation study where we calibrate the model to match US data. In Section 4 we ex-tend the model to also feature 'in ‡ation non-neutrality'and show that this is a potential explanation for the negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation prevailing since the mid 1970s. Section 5 studies the implications of our model for the term structure of real interest rates and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains a description of the bootstrap procedure used to compute p-values in the predictability regressions, and it gives the detailed derivations of the central equations of the economic model.
The price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation
Empirical studies of money illusion in the stock market typically consider the relation between the price-dividend ratio and a constructed measure of expected in ‡ation. For example, Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) use an exponentially declining moving average of past in ‡ation as their measure of expected in ‡ation and regress the price-dividend ratio onto that measure. Assuming that actual in ‡ation is positively correlated with expected in ‡ation, and in the spirit of Fama (1975) , we instead consider predictive regressions of future actual in ‡ation on the price-dividend ratio. Table 1 presents regression results based on t;t+k = ;k + ;k pd t + " ;t+k ,
where pd t is the log price-dividend ratio and t;t+k = P k 1 j=0 t+1+j denotes the sum of one-period log in ‡ation from period t to t + k: As emphasized by Cochrane (2008) , k needs to be at least 15 to 20 years to get the power gains of long-horizon regressions, so we let k take the values 1, 5, 10, 15, and 20 years. With ;k 6 = 0 expected in ‡ation is time-varying as captured by the price-dividend ratio. For k = 1 we compute t-statistics using Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, while for k > 1 we use Hodrick (1992) standard errors, which for these types of regressions have better size properties in small samples, cf. Ang and Bekaert (2007) . To account for potential small-sample bias that can arise due to the use of a highly persistent predictor variable such as the price-dividend ratio, we also report bootstrapped p-values (P B in Table 1 ) computed under the null hypothesis of no predictability (see Appendix 1 for details of the bootstrap procedure). We use Robert Shiller's annual US data, which cover the period 1871-2016. For the regressions in Table 1 we use S&P stock prices and dividends as well as the Consumer Price Index to compute in ‡ation and the price-dividend 5 ratio. 2 For the full sample period (1871-2016) Table 1 shows that the price-dividend ratio predicts future in ‡ation with a positive sign. This holds irrespective of the horizon, although the statistical evidence is strongest for large values of k. Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of in ‡ation predictability by the price-dividend ratio. The …gure shows the log price-dividend ratio (the solid line) and the subsequent 20-year log in ‡ation rate (the dashed line). In ‡ation stops at 1996, the last year with a 20-year future in ‡ation rate (from 1996 to 2016). As seen, there is a clear tendency that the two variables move together.
However, Figure 1 also indicates a structural shift in the relation between the pricedividend ratio and future in ‡ation. Since the mid 1970s the price-dividend ratio appears to predict future in ‡ation with a negative sign. To show that this structural shift holds across all horizons, Table 1 contains predictive regression results for the two sub-sample periods: 1871-1976 and 1977-2016 . The early sub-sample is de…ned such that the last observation for pd t is in 1976, while in ‡ation continues for an additional k years to be consistent with the forecast regression (1) . For the latter sub-sample we only consider horizons of 1 and 5 years due to a lower number of observations. In this sample period the …rst observation for pd t is 1977 and future in ‡ation begins in 1978. In ‡ation thus overlaps to a certain degree across the two sub-sample periods, but importantly the data for the price-dividend ratio are distinctively di¤erent. 3 In the early sub-sample the price-dividend ratio predicts future in ‡ation with a positive sign and the statistical evidence is even stronger than for the full sample period. For example, ;k is now also statistically di¤erent from zero for k = 1 as evidenced by the bootstrapped p-value of 0.017 and the R 2 has more than doubled compared to the full sample period. However, for the late sub-sample the predictive coe¢ cient, ;k , has changed sign, but the relation is still statistically signi…cant for both k = 1 and 5. The price-dividend ratio thus signi…cantly predicts future in ‡ation with a positive sign up till the mid 1970s and with a negative sign thereafter.
In Table 1 and in our subsequent analyses we have set the break date between 1976 and 1977. In some sense this is an arbitrary choice but we emphasize that none of 2 In unreported regressions we obtain similar results using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We present our …ndings based on Robert Shiller's data since these cover a longer sample period compared to CRSP data. (Here and all subsequent places where we refer to unreported results, details are available upon request to the authors). 3 Bruno and Sachs, 1985) . In 1976 Milton Friedman received the Nobel prize and in his Nobel lecture (Friedman, 1977) he discusses in detail this shift, emphasizing both the importance of expectations and the tendency to confuse nominal for real changes, i.e. money illusion. In relation to the new paradigm of in ‡ation, Friedman writes (p. 469): "It restored the primacy of the distinction between real and nominal magnitudes". Thus, one can argue that 1976-1977 marks the end of the 'old view'and beginning of the 'new view'of in ‡ation. The increased attention to the impact of in ‡ation immediately led to analyses of in ‡ation's impact on asset prices (e.g. Fama and Schwert, 1977; Modigliani and Cohn, 1979: Fama, 1981 ).
The empirical results in Table 1 raise a fundamental question. The existing literature on money illusion generally supports a negative relation between stock prices and expected in ‡ation, both empirically (e.g. Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004 ) and theoretically (Basak and Yan, 2010) . Does that then rule out money illusion as a potential explanation for the documented positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and actual future in ‡ation up to the mid 1970s? Furthermore, what explains the negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation since the mid 1970s? In the remainder of the paper, we address these questions.
The price-dividend ratio and future returns and dividend growth
Before presenting a formal model of money illusion we will elaborate on the consequences of in ‡ation predictability by the price-dividend ratio for our understanding of price movements in the stock market. The price-dividend ratio is often used as predictor for future stock returns and dividend growth. Campbell and Shiller (1988) provide theoretical support for using the price-dividend ratio as predictor through their log-linearized present value relation (the dynamic Gordon growth model):
d t+1 is the …rst di¤erence of log dividends, r t is log stock return, = e E(pd) =(1 + e E(pd) ), and c is a linearization constant. E t is the expectations operator, conditional on information at time t.
4 Equation (2) holds for both nominal and real variables. If we de…ne r t+1+j and d t+1+j in nominal terms and let t+1+j denote log in ‡ation from time t + j to t + 1 + j, then we can write equation (2) as
Thus, the price-dividend ratio re ‡ects expected future returns and/or dividend growth either in nominal or in real terms. This just re ‡ects the fact that the price-dividend ratio is independent of whether dividends and prices are measured in nominal or real terms. The rewrited Campbell-Shiller relation, equation (3), is a dynamic accounting identity that automatically links the current price-dividend ratio to future returns, dividend growth, and in ‡ation.
If investors do not su¤er from money illusion, a change in expected in ‡ation ( t+1+j ) will change expected nominal returns (r t+1+j ) and nominal dividend growth ( d t+1+j ) one for one and leave pd t una¤ected. However, if investors do su¤er from money illusion, pd t will move with changes in t+1+j ; and from (3) it is clear that if pd t has predictive power for future in ‡ation then it will predict nominal and real returns and dividend growth di¤erently. As seen from (3), depending on the sign of in ‡ation predictability, real returns and/or dividend growth will be either more or less predictable than nominal returns and/or dividend growth. With positive in ‡ation predictability we should expect real returns to be more predictable than nominal returns, and vice versa for dividend growth. Table 2 shows the results from the following regressions over the sample period 1871-4 Equation (2) is derived based on a …rst-order Taylor expansion of the de…nition of the one-period return. Thus, there is a linearization error that makes (2) only hold approximately. Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Engsted, Pedersen, and Tanggaard (2012) show, however, that the approximation error is negligible.
8 1976 x t;t+k = n;k + n;k pd t + " n;t+k , (x t;t+k t;t+k ) = r;k + r;k pd t + " r;t+k , where x t;t+k is either P k 1 j=0 r t+1+j or
i.e. the sum from period t to t + k of one-period nominal log returns or one-period nominal log dividend growth: 5 We use the same data and the same standard errors and bootstrap approach as in the case of in ‡ation predictability (Table 1) .
Evaluating return predictability in Table 2 , we see that although the slope coe¢ cient has the theoretically correct negative sign, cf. (2), nominal returns are statistically unpredictable by the price-dividend ratio even at a 10% signi…cance level (except for k = 5). The price-dividend ratio is, however, a strong predictor of future real returns. Taking small-sample bias into account (i.e. using the p-value P B ) we …nd evidence of real return predictability for k > 1 at a 5% signi…cance level and for k = 1 at a 10% signi…cance level.
The interesting implication of these …ndings is that if returns are truly unpredictable, positive in ‡ation predictability will make real returns predictable, as evidenced by the signi…cant b r;k values in Table 2 . Conversely, if returns are truly predictable, such in ‡ation predictability may make nominal returns unpredictable, as evidenced by the insigni…cant b n;k values in Table 2 . Similarly, we …nd that nominal dividend growth is signi…cantly predictable with the theoretically correct positive sign, cf. (2), but only for k = 1 is real dividend growth predictable. In fact, for k > 5 the predictive coe¢ cient turns negative. These results are consistent with positive in ‡ation predictability over the period 1871-1976 as shown in Table 1 . 6 We believe that these di¤erences between nominal and real return and dividend growth predictability due to in ‡ation predictability are not generally acknowledged, although emphasized by Engsted and Pedersen (2010) . Whether to interpret the empirical results as evidence of predictability or unpredictability of returns and dividend growth by the price-dividend ratio naturally hinges on the underlying economic 5 According to (3) it should be future long-horizon discounted in ‡ation, returns, and dividend growth (where the discount factor is ) that are related to pd t . Since is only slightly less than one, in practice it makes no di¤erence whether the variables are discounted or not, and hence we do not discount with . We have done all regressions also using discounted values and none of the results change qualitatively. 6 Unreported results show that for the period 1977-2016, nominal stock returns are more predictable by the price-dividend ratio than real returns (both with a negative sign), which is consistent with negative in ‡ation predictability in this period (cf. Table 1 ). Also for dividend growth is the di¤erence between real and nominal predictability consistent with negative in ‡ation predictability, although dividend growth is virtually unpredictable in this period. 9 model. In the next section we develop an economic model based on money illusion to explain the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation.
Is money illusion the explanation?
To evaluate if money illusion can explain the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation, we derive an economic model that explicitly allows investors to su¤er from money illusion. The model is related to the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) based on Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) recursive preferences. Our model is also related to the asset pricing model of Basak and Yan (2010) who consider the impact of money illusion but do so using time-separable power utility. Both analytically and through a simulation study, the model delivers important economic insights into money illusion as an explanation for the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation.
As will become clear through the rest of the paper, existing models linking asset prices to in ‡ation cannot explain the positive relation between stock prices and and future in ‡ation over the period . This includes the model by Basak and Yan (2010) based on time-separable power utility and featuring money illusion, and the longrun risk model by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) featuring in ‡ation non-neutrality. In contrast, the model developed in this paper is consistent with the empirical …ndings over the period 1871-1976.
Economic model
The representative agent is assumed to have Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) recursive preferences,
where C t is real consumption at time t, 0 < < 1 is the time discount factor, 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In the special case where = 1= ; that is = 1, the above recursive preferences collapse to standard time-separable power utility. Note also that the sign of is determined by and : For example, will be negative if > 1 and > 1, but positive if > 1 and < 1. While there is general agreement that > 1; the value of is subject to controversy. Hall (1988) and Beeler and Campbell (2012) , among others, …nd evidence of < 1 while, for example, Attanasio and Weber (1993), Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) , and Chen, Favilukas, and Ludvigson (2013) …nd to be above one. 7 Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint W t+1 = (W t C t ) R c;t+1 yields the following Euler equation for asset i,
where W t is wealth, R i;t is the gross return on asset i, and R c;t is the gross return on a claim to aggregate consumption. This implies that the log stochastic discount factor is given as
where lowercase letters denote logs to the corresponding uppercase letters. If investors su¤er from money illusion in the sense that they discount real cash ‡ows with a nominal discount factor the log stochastic discount factor can be written as
where 0 1 determines the degree of money illusion. = 1 implies perfect money illusion, while = 0 implies no money illusion. This way of modeling the stochastic discount factor under (partial) money illusion follows Basak and Yan (2010) and implies that both stock and bond market investors fail to properly account for the e¤ect of in ‡ation. This contrasts with the traditional Modigliani and Cohn (1979) hypothesis, where only stock market investors su¤er from money illusion. Thus, there is a di¤erent kind of incoherence involved in the two approaches to money illusion: in Modigliani-Cohn type of money illusion bond markets are rational but stock markets are not. In Basak and Yan's model, by contrast, both markets are rational in all aspects, except that investors use a distorted stochastic discount factor to discount real cash ‡ows on all assets.
In Section 5 we study the e¤ects of money illusion on the term structure of real interest rates, but for now we focus on the stock market. We follow Bansal and Yaron (2004) and distinguish between the unobservable return on the claim to aggregate consumption, R c;t+1 ; and the observable return on the dividend claim, R m;t+1 ; i.e. the return on the market portfolio, and log-linearize these returns, cf. Campbell and Shiller (1988) :
pc t is short-hand notation for the log price-consumption ratio and pd t is (as before) the log price-dividend ratio. k i;0 and k i;1 for i = c; d are constants that are a function of the linearization point which typically is chosen to be the sample average of the ratio in question. 8 More speci…cally, k i;1 is computed as exp (z) = [1 + exp (z)] and k i;0 as ln (k i;1 ) (1 k i;1 ) ln (1=k i;1 1), where z denotes the linearization point for the pricedividend ratio and price-consumption ratio, respectively.
To close the model, we assume that consumption, dividends, and in ‡ation have the following dynamics:
x c;t+1 = 1 x c;t + xc " c;t+1 ; (11)
All shocks ( i;t+1 , i = c; d; ; " i;t+1 , i = c; ) are mutually uncorrelated iid normally distributed with mean zero and variance one. Consumption growth, dividend growth, and in ‡ation are all modeled as containing a small persistent predictable component (x c;t and x ;t , with 1 > 0 and 3 > 0). Note that dividend growth is driven in part by the persistent consumption growth component through the leverage parameter . This feature of the model follows Bansal and Yaron (2004) . Note also that although in ‡ation will have real e¤ects through money illusion, in ‡ation will be 'neutral' by not directly a¤ecting the real variables of the model. In Section 4 we extend equation (11) by the term 2 x ;t to allow for in ‡ation non-neutrality.
We consider the simplest possible setup that will deliver insights into the relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation and, hence, we do not allow for time-varying volatility. In solving the model we …rst conjecture that the log price-consumption ratio is a linear function of the state variables:
With joint log-normality the Euler equation for the consumption claim (allowing for potential money illusion), can be written as
Inserting the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (12) , the log-linearized return relation (6) , and the log price-consumption ratio (13), we verify the conjectured solution. See Appendix 2 for additional details as well as the expressions for A 0 ; A 1 and A 2 (in a generalized setting where we also allow for in ‡ation non-neutrality, cf. Section 4).
Next, we conjecture that the log price-dividend ratio is also a linear function of the state variables:
Again, with joint log-normality the Euler equation for the dividend claim (allowing for 9 The assumption of constant volatility implies constant risk premia, but extending the model to include time-varying volatility and hence time-varying risk premia does not change the relation between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation shown later in (14) and (16) . Furthermore, unreported simulation results show similar empirical relations between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation whether or not volatility is constant or time-varying. potential money illusion), can be written as
Similar to the case with the price-consumption ratio we insert the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (12), the log-linearized return relations (6)- (7), the log priceconsumption ratio (13) , and the log price-dividend ratio (14) to verify the conjectured solution. See Appendix 3 for additional details as well as the expression for B 0 (in a generalized setting where we also allow for in ‡ation non-neutrality, cf. Section 4). The coe¢ cients of interest in our case are B 1 and B 2 that are given as
Regarding the sign of B 1 we …rst see that the denominator is positive (assuming a stationary process for expected consumption growth and a log-linearization constant below 1), while the sign of the numerator depends on the relative size of the leverage coe¢ cient and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ; B 1 > 0 for high values of relative to , and vice versa. In other words, for > 1= higher expected growth leads investors to buy more stocks driving up the price-dividend ratio, i.e. the substitution e¤ect dominates. In contrast, for < 1= the wealth e¤ect dominates such that the price-dividend ratio decreases when expected growth increases.
The link between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation is determined by B 2 . Again, we see that the denominator is positive (assuming a stationary process for expected in ‡ation and a log-linearization constant below 1) such that our main focus should be on the numerator. Since is positive, the sign of B 2 is determined by
The empirical evidence of a positive relation between the pricedividend ratio and in ‡ation documented in Table 1 can thus be explained by investors su¤ering from money illusion and having recursive preferences with the preference parameters and simultaneously being either larger than one or smaller than one such that < 0 and, hence, B 2 > 0. In contrast, if either or is above one and the other preference parameter is below one, then there will be a negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation. Note that this negative relation will also arise if investors have time-separable power utility in which case = 1, which is consistent with the model of Basak and Yan (2010).
To gain some intuition for money illusion and its impact on stock prices it is instructive to consider the Euler equation (4) 
Note that in the special case of standard power utility ( = 1 ) the …rst term in the brackets cancels out and the coe¢ cient on consumption growth is instead of 1 1 . If in ‡ation is expected to increase at time t + 1, then marginal utility for an investor su¤ering from money illusion will decrease at time t + 1: Stated di¤erently, the investor su¤ering from money illusion expects higher returns at time t + 1 simply due to increases in in ‡ation. As also argued by Basak and Yan (2010), a standard power utility investor responds to the decrease in marginal utility by transfering consumption from time t + 1 to t resulting in decreasing asset prices at time t. Hence, there is a negative relation between asset prices and expected in ‡ation. With recursive preferences the investor's consumption decision depends on both the degree of relative risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For example, with > 1 and a dominating substitution e¤ect ( > 1), increases in expected in ‡ation leads the investor to transfer consumption from time t to t + 1 resulting in increasing asset prices at time t: In other words, the investor seeks to take advantage of the perceived higher expected returns by reducing consumption and increasing savings at time t, causing an upward pressure on asset prices.
Simulation study
To explore the implications from the economic model in terms of in ‡ation predictability by the price-dividend ratio, we calibrate the model at the annual frequency such that it matches the mean, standard deviation and persistence of dividend growth, consumption growth, and in ‡ation, respectively, over the sample period 1871-1976. We focus on this sub-sample period due to the observed structural break in the mid 1970s and because the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation in this period seems to contrast with existing evidence (e.g. Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004 To provide some inspiration for the data-generating parameters related to the latent variables of the model, we estimate equations (11) and (12) using survey data for expected in ‡ation and expected consumption growth (proxied by expected GDP growth). We consider data both from the Livingston Survey, which is given on a semi-annual basis since 1951, and from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which is given on a quarterly basis since 1968. In both cases we make use of one-year ahead forecasts. Table 3 contains the results. Although the survey data cover a much smaller sample period, we use the estimated coe¢ cients and regression standard errors (both converted to annual frequency) to guide us in our choice of data-generating parameter values. 10 The data-generating parameters and the results from in ‡ation predictability regressions with horizons matching those in Table 1 are given in Table 4, while Table 5 contains the corresponding descriptive statistics. The persistence parameters 1 and 3 are set equal to 0.50 and 0.90, respectively. Bansal and Yaron (2004) choose the value 0.979 for 1 in their calibration at a monthly frequency ( 3 does not appear in their model). Our expected consumption growth series display much less persistence. This is due to our use of annual instead of monthly data, and because we calibrate the model to the period 1871-1976 where realized consumption growth (and dividend growth, in ‡ation, and the price-dividend ratio) display relatively little persistence as seen from Table 5 . For we follow Bansal and Yaron and set it equal to 3. In our main scenario we set = 2 and = 2: The reported numbers are averages across 10,000 simulations each of length 105+k, which matches the length of the sample period 1871-1976 plus the forecast horizon consistent with the empirical analysis in Table 1 .
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The …rst set of results in Panel A of Table 4 is for the case with no money illusion ( = 10 Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) use data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters to estimate equations similar to (11) and (12) . In Section 4 we compare our results to those of Bansal and Shaliastovich. 11 At this point it will be relevant to address the critique of Epstein, Farhi, and Strzalecki (2014). They criticize the long-run risk literature based on Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences for not paying enough attention to temporal resolution of risk, which is a function of the preference parameters and the datagenerating process for consumption. They ask the question: "What fraction of your consumption stream would you give up in order for all risk to be resolved next month?" and call this fraction the timing premium. Based on the consumption process and preference parameters used by Bansal and Yaron (2004), Epstein et al. compute the timing premium to be of the order 25-30 percent, which they …nd to be unrealistically high. Compared to Bansal and Yaron, we work with a much lower value of relative risk aversion, a less persistent consumption process, and constant volatility, all of which reduce the size of the timing premium. With constant volatility and = = 2, as in our main scenario, Figure 1 in Epstein et al. (2014) indicates a timing premium in the order of 5-10 percent. Due to a less persistent consumption process the timing premium will be even lower in our case. Hence, Epstein et al.'s critique is not a concern in our case. 0; = 2; = 2). As expected from (16) there is in this case no in ‡ation predictability from the price-dividend ratio; the slope coe¢ cients and t-statistics are virtually zero. If we allow for money illusion but assume investors have time-separable power utility ( = 1; = 0:5; = 2, cf. Panel B in Table 4 ) we would expect to …nd a negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and in ‡ation, cf. (16) and Basak and Yan (2010) . This is exactly what we …nd in the simulation study. The slope coe¢ cients are negative and strongly signi…cant for all horizons. Note, however, that this is in direct contrast to the empirical results for the early sub-sample in Table 1 , where the slope coe¢ cients are positive. If we allow for money illusion and recursive preferences ( = 1; = 2; = 2, cf. Panel C in Table 4 ) the simulation results line up much better with the empirical …ndings. The slope coe¢ cients are signi…cantly positive for all horizons.
To ensure that our results under money illusion and recursive preferences do not come about due to unrealistic simulated data, Table 5 compares the mean, standard deviation, and persistence of actual dividend growth, consumption growth, in ‡ation, and the price-dividend ratio over the period 1871-1976 to the simulated series. Overall we see a good match between the actual and simulated data, except for the standard deviation of the price-dividend ratio and the persistence of in ‡ation which are a bit too low in the simulated data.
In our main scenario we set = = 2, but the in ‡ation predictability results do not critically hinge on these speci…c values of the preference parameters. However, high relative risk aversion will reduce the degree of in ‡ation predictability; the absolute value of = (1 ) = (1 1= ) will increase and hence the e¤ect of money illusion will decrease, cf. (16) . Likewise, values of closer to 1 and only partial money illusion, 0 < < 1; will also reduce predictability. These implications are all supported by unreported simulation results.
The main result in this section is that in a model featuring money illusion and recursive preferences, and with reasonable preference parameters, we are able to match the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡ation up till the mid 1970s. In the next section we investigate an alternative model and look speci…cally at the most recent period 1977-2016.
What about in ‡ation non-neutrality?
Given that the existing literature on money illusion generally supports a negative relation between stock prices and expected in ‡ation, it is interesting to observe the results for the sample period 1977-2016 in Table 1 which are consistent with this literature. The natural question is whether money illusion explains both the positive relation between stock prices and future in ‡ation up till the mid 1970s and the negative relation since then? This would be possible if, for example, there was a structural shift in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution at that time such that it went from being above 1 to below 1. However, what would explain such a structural shift exactly at that point in time? Although there is empirical evidence that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution varies over time, cf. Thimme (2017), the existing literature does not suggest a structural shift in in the mid 1970s.
We can also interpret our …ndings such that money illusion emerged in the mid 1970s if we are willing to assume that > 1 and < 1: The negative relation between the pricedividend ratio and in ‡ation documented in Table 1 for the period 1977-2016 would then be consistent with the existing literature. However, that would require an alternative explanation for the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and in ‡ation up till the mid 1970s. In this section we explore in ‡ation non-neutrality as a potential alternative explanation.
Following Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013), we extend the economic model to allow for in ‡ation non-neutrality by replacing (11) with x c;t+1 = 1 x c;t + 2 x ;t + xc " c;t+1 ; (17) which creates a link between real consumption growth (and hence the stochastic discount factor) and expected in ‡ation, thereby giving a rational alternative to money illusion for explaining the relation between stock prices and in ‡ation. In solving the model with (17) instead of (11) we maintain the conjecture that the log price-dividend ratio is a linear function of the state variables, cf. (14) . B 1 remains unchanged while B 2 now re ‡ects the e¤ect of in ‡ation non-neutrality (see Appendix 3 for details):
With no money illusion, = 0; but in ‡ation non-neutrality, 2 6 = 0; it is possible to obtain a positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation. This is the case if B 1 and 2 are of the same sign. Recall that the sign of B 1 depends on the size of relative to (i.e. whether the substitution e¤ect or the wealth e¤ect dominates), while the sign of 2 is more unclear and ultimately an empirical matter. In a long-run risk setup Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) use (17) to study the e¤ect of in ‡ation nonneutrality on bond return predictability and violations of the uncovered interest rate parity in currency markets. Using data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters from 1969 to 2010, they …nd evidence that 2 < 0 which is in line with the common perception that if in ‡ation has a direct e¤ect on the real economy it should be with a negative sign.
If 2 < 0, the wealth e¤ect needs to dominate (i.e. < 1= ) in order for the pricedividend ratio to be positively related to expected in ‡ation. In this case an increase in expected consumption growth as a consequence of a decrease in expected in ‡ation ( 2 < 0) leads to a smaller increase in expected dividend growth (through ) than in expected returns (through ), and thereby drive down the price-dividend ratio. In contrast, if 2 < 0 and the substitution e¤ect dominates (i.e. > 1= ) the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation are negatively related, consistent with the empirical results for the period since the mid 1970s.
To further study the presence of in ‡ation non-neutrality and a potential break in 2 in the mid 1970s, we estimate (17) for the period up till 1976 and over the period 1977-2016 using data from both the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Livingston Survey. The results are given in Table 3 , Panel C. We cannot reject that 2 = 0 in the early sub-sample period, which suggests that in ‡ation non-neutrality cannot explain the positive relation between stock prices and future in ‡ation up till the mid 1970s. Likewise, we cannot reject that 2 = 0 over the period 1977-2016. However, in estimating their asset pricing model over the period 1969-2010, Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) conclude that 2 is signi…cantly negative. And, despite our formal non-rejection of 2 = 0, the results in Table 3 indicate a potential change of sign of 2 such that it turns negative in the mid 1970s. The breakpoint tests reported in the notes to Table 3 do in fact support a structural break in 2 in the mid 1970s for both the Livingston Survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Similar to the in ‡ation predictability results (Table  1) it is interesting to note that the shift in 2 comes after a period of high in ‡ation and increased attention to the impact of in ‡ation on asset prices and economic growth (cf. section 2). The negative 2 combined with a dominating substitution e¤ect, such that B 1 is positive (which is the case for the parameters used in the simulation study in Section 3.2), implies a negative relation between stock prices and expected in ‡ation in accordance with the empirical results for the sample period 1977-2016. The results in Table 3 , Panel C, thus suggest that in ‡ation non-neutrality can explain the negative relation between stock prices and in ‡ation since the mid 1970s.
To explore further if in ‡ation non-neutrality can explain the empirical …ndings in the sample period 1977-2016 we conduct a simulation study similar to the case with money illusion, where we calibrate the model at the annual frequency. Again we use the results from Table 3 (converted to annual frequency) to guide our choice of datagenerating parameter values for the expected consumption and expected in ‡ation series. The data-generating parameters and the results from in ‡ation predictability regressions with horizons matching those in Table 1 are given in Table 6 . We maintain the same preference parameters as in the case of money illusion, i.e. = 2 and = 2: Table 6 shows that 2 < 0 does generate the theoretically correct negative slope coe¢ cient (given > 1= , which is the case when = 2 and = 3) when predicting future in ‡ation by the price-dividend ratio. Table  4 and the last 25 observations (1977-2002 ) based on the data-generating parameters in Table 6 . Using the combined time series, unreported results reveal a negative relation between the price-dividend ratio and expected in ‡ation constructed using an adaptive expectations formation scheme as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho. Our …ndings are thus not in contrast to those by Campbell and Vuolteenaho; the di¤erence just re ‡ects that Campbell and Vulteenaho use a sample period that includes a structural break in the relation between the price-dividend ratio and in ‡ation.
Overall, the above results suggest that 2 turned negative in the mid 1970s and that this is a potential explanation for the negative relation we have observed between stock prices and in ‡ation since that time, cf. Table 1 . If we are willing to claim that 2 < 0 from the mid 1970s based on the results in Table 3 (although also acknowledging that Bansal and Shaliastovich, 2013, …nd evidence that 2 is signi…cantly negative over a period starting in 1969) one could also argue that 2 > 0 up till the mid 1970s. That is, high expected in ‡ation would lead to high expected economic growth, as in a standard Phillips curve. A positive 2 can yield a positive relation between stock prices and expected in ‡ation when = 2 and = 3, cf. (18) . To further distinguish between the two competing explanations for the positive relation between stock prices and future in ‡ation in the period 1871-1976, we turn to the term structure of real interest rates in the next section.
5 What about the term structure of real interest rates?
Following Basak and Yan (2010), we specify the stochastic discount factor as in (5) which implies that both stock and bond market investors su¤er from money illusion, in contrast to the traditional Modigliani and Cohn (1979) hypothesis where only stock market investors are not able to properly account for the e¤ect of in ‡ation. Given that our model implies that also bond market investors su¤er from money illusion we now consider the impact of money illusion on the term structure of real interest rates. We allow for both money illusion and in ‡ation non-neutrality. Apart from the presence of money illusion the model is closely related to the term structure model by Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) who also formulate their model in a consumption-based long-run risk setup.
Given joint log-normality and money illusion, the Euler equation for real zero coupon bonds is given as
where b m t+1 is given by (5) and p (n) t denotes the log price of a real zero coupon bond at time t with n periods to maturity. Using the same approach as in the case of stocks, we conjecture that the real bond price is a linear function of the state variables,
where the coe¢ cients are now a function of maturity. Next, we insert (20) into the Euler equation (19) along with the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (10), (12), (17), the log-linearized return relation (6) , and the log price-consumption ratio (13) to verify the conjectured solution (see Appendix 4 for additional details). Since the real interest rate is given as r
t =n, we get the following model-implied term structure 21 of real interest rates:
For n = 1 this simpli…es to
since
is not de…ned for n = 1:
As we saw in Section 3, to explain the positive relation between stock prices and in ‡ation with money illusion it must hold that < 0, i.e. and need to be simultaneously either larger or smaller than one. In (21) with < 0, money illusion implies a negative relation between the short term real interest rate and expected in ‡ation. This relation also holds for n > 1 since (1
Thus, in periods with high expected in ‡ation real interest rates are low, which drives up stock prices consistent with our …ndings in Section 3. It is also consistent with the general …nding in the empirical literature of a negative relation between short term real interest rates and expected in‡ation, e.g. Ang et al. (2008) . Also, replacing the price-dividend ratio as predictor for future in ‡ation in Table 1 with the 1-year real interest rate from Robert Shiller's data, Table 7 shows a strong negative relation across all horizons consistent with the economic model under money illusion. Interestingly, since the mid 1970s the relation between real interest rates and in ‡ation appears less strong. For k = 1 there is a strong negative relation up till the mid 1970s (P B = 0:000; R 2 = 0:091) while since the mid 1970s the relation is insigni…cant (P B = 0:218; R 2 = 0:018). These …ndings are consistent with money illusion being present until the mid 1970s and then disappearing.
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As seen from (21), in ‡ation non-neutrality has no e¤ect on the short term real interest rate, but for n > 1 a negative 2 implies a negative relation between real interest rates and expected in ‡ation since D (i) 1 < 0 for all i: This is consistent with Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013). The strong negative relation between the short term real interest rate and in ‡ation up till the mid 1970s can thus not be explained by in ‡ation non-neutrality, which provides additional support to money illusion as the explanation for the empirical …ndings. Likewise, the potential presence of in ‡ation non-neutrality since the mid 1970s, as argued in Section 4, should have no impact on the short term real interest rate, cf. (21) , which again is consistent with the empirical evidence in Table 7 . As mentioned in Section 4, a positive 2 could in theory explain the positive relation between stock prices and in ‡ation in the period 1871-1976, but again, 2 has no impact on the short term real interest rate and this explanation would thus be inconsistent with the empirical …ndings in Table 7 .
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that a fundamental shift in the relationship between stock prices and in ‡ation happened during the 1970s. Up to the mid 1970s …nancial markets su¤ered from money illusion, but the high and increasing in ‡ation of the late 1960s and early 1970s made investors more aware of the impact of in ‡ation and, thus, money illusion disappeared. The main motivation for our analysis is the new …nding that up to the mid 1970s the price-dividend ratio strongly and positively predicts future in ‡ation, whereas over the last 40 years the price-dividend ratio predicts future in ‡ation with a negative coe¢ cient.
We have argued that the increased awareness of in ‡ation and its consequences during the late 1960s and …rst half of the 1970s explains both the disappearance of money illusion and the appearance of in ‡ation non-neutrality, i.e. the direct negative e¤ect of in ‡ation expectations on real economic growth. In the …nancial economics literature this direct e¤ect is often modeled as in equation (17) with 2 < 0 (e.g. Bansal and Shaliastovich, 2013) . Our analysis is consistent with such a direct in ‡ation non-neutrality e¤ect kicking in after the structural shift in the mid 1970s. Our analysis then also points to an explanation for the depressed stock prices at the late 1970s that is fundamentally di¤erent from the explanation given by Modigliani and Cohn (1979) and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) . They argue that the low stock prices were caused by high expected in ‡ation in combination with money illusion in the stock market (but not in the bond market). Our model implies that by the end of the 1970s money illusion had vanished; instead, high expected in ‡ation led to low expected economic growth and, consequently, to low stock prices.
Furthermore, our money illusion explanation for the stock price -in ‡ation relationship up to the mid 1970s di¤ers fundamentally from the traditional Modigliani-Cohn explanation. In our model both stock and bond markets su¤er from money illusion and investors have recursive preferences with low risk aversion and high elasticity of intertemporal subsitution. In combination with small but persistent components in economic growth, this model generates the positive relation between the price-dividend ratio and future in ‡a-tion that we see in the data up to the mid 1970s. The Modigliani-Cohn model cannot explain this positive relationship.
Appendices Appendix 1. The bootstrap procedure
The general scheme in the bootstrap procedure to test the null hypothesis of no predictability, while accounting for potential small-sample bias, is as follows:
1. Use OLS to estimate
where y t;t+k = f t;t+k ; r t;t+k ; r t;t+k t;t+k ; g to obtain an estimate of k , denoted b k , for k = f1; 5; 10; 15; 20g :
2. Use OLS to estimate
where y t+1 = f t+1 ; r t+1 ; r t+1 t+1 ; g ; i.e. we here consider one-period in ‡ation, nominal returns, and real returns. This yields the following relevant estimates: b ; b $; b ; and b ; where is the covariance matrix of the residuals:
3. Generate T random numbers of (" t+1 ; ! t+1 ) from a multivariate normal distribution with covariance matrix b : We denote these simulated error terms " t+1 ; ! t+1 :
4. Generate a random initial value of pd t :
where pd and b 2 pd denote the sample average and the variance, respectively, of the price-dividend ratio.
Use b
$ and b together with the generated values of ! t+1 and the initial value in steps 3 and 4 to obtain T observations of pd t :
6. Use b together with the generated values of " t+1 to obtain T observations of y t under the null hypothesis = 0:
7. Construct multi-period in ‡ation/returns y t;t+k = P k 1 i=0 y t+1+i for k = f1; 5; 10; 15; 20g using the one-period series. The following steps are carried out for all relevant values of k.
Use OLS to estimate
and denote the estimated slope coe¢ cient e (1) k :
9. Repeat steps 3-8 M = 10; 000 times to obtain e (1) k ; e (2) k ; :::; e (M )
10. Compute the upper one-sided p-value under the null hypothesis as
where I [ ] is an indicator function. For the lower one-sided p-value, the inequality signs are reversed.
Compute the bias as
We have evaluated the robustness of the results in a number of ways. First, we have done the analysis using residual-based bootstrapping in step 2 as an alternative to parametric bootstrapping. Second, we have adjusted b for bias before generating data in step 5. Finally, given a fairly persistent in ‡ation process we have i) generated data such that " t+1 follows an AR(1) process, ii) made use of a block bootstrap, and iii) included lagged in ‡ation as a predictor variable both in the predictive regression and in the bootstrap. None of these modi…cations of the bootstrap procedure outlined above changes the qualitative conclusions in the empirical analysis.
Appendix 2. Solving for the price-consumption ratio
With joint log-normality the Euler equation for the consumption claim (allowing for potential money illusion) can be written as:
Inserting the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (10), (12), (17), the log-linearized return relation (6) , and the conjectured log-price consumption ratio (13) , the conditional mean is given by:
Likewise, the conditional variance is given by:
= V ar t c c;t+1 + k c;1 (A 1 xc " c;t+1 + A 2 x " ;t+1 ) + c c;t+1
Solving for A 0 yields:
Solving for A 1 yields:
Solving for A 2 yields:
Appendix 3. Solving for the price-dividend ratio
With joint log-normality the Euler equation for the dividend claim (allowing for potential money illusion) can be written as:
Inserting the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (10), (12), (17) , the log-linearized return relations (6)- (7), the log-price consumption ratio (13) , and the log-28 price-dividend ratio (14) , the conditional mean is given by: 
(1 ) k c;1 (A 1 xc " c;t+1 + A 2 x " ;t+1 ) (1 ) c c;t+1
Solving for B 0 yields:
Solving for B 1 yields (when inserting for A 1 ):
Solving for B 2 yields (when inserting for A 2 ):
Appendix 4: Solving for the term structure of real interest rates
With joint log-normality the Euler equation for zero coupon bonds (allowing for potential money illusion) can be written as:
where b m t+1 is given by (5) .
Inserting the data-generating processes for the state variables (8)- (10), (12), (17) , the log-linearized return relation (6), the conjectured log-price consumption ratio (13) , and the conjectured bond price (20) , the conditional mean is given by:
Solving for D (n) 0 yields:
yields:
yields: Table 4 , Panel C. The reported numbers in the simulation study are averages across 10,000 simulations each of a length matching the sample period 1871-1976. AC (1) is the …rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient. Table 6 . In ‡ation predictability by the price-dividend ratio under in ‡ation non-neutrality. 
